Memory theorizing is going nowhere. The reason is that it is rooted in mediationism, the doctrine that memory is mediated by some sort of memory trace. Mediationism is the basic tenet of those who seek the substrate of memory; for students of memory per se it is merely a metaphor, and moreover an unfruitful one, for it cannot be penetrated by the methods of psychology. The rejection of mediationism would serve both to replace mechanistic theories with laws or other modes of explanation and to focus research on the actual experience of memory and on the context in which it occurs. The ensuing advantages are discussed and illustrated.
Memory theorizing appears to be progressing nicely. Indeed, judging from the sheer number of pages it consumes in the literature, it appears to be progressing as never before. But the appearance is deceptive, for something is wrong. Very wrong.
The argument to be made here is that our memory theories are not only failing to generate a lasting understanding, but are actually counterproductive. The problem is a fundamental one, and its correction will require a radical change in the way memory is conceptualized. Before pinpointing the problem, let us review the contemporary scene. 
An Era of Cheap Theories
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there are addresses, readout rules, and holding mechanisms ... our memories are filled with T-stacks, implicit associational responses, natural-language mediators, images, multiple traces, tags, kernel sentences, markers, relational rules, verbal loops, and onebuns" (p. 1). The ensuing years have been no less bountiful, and today's memories are burdened as never before.
Such a lavish array of hypothetical constructs offers a boundless source of theories. And researchers-who themselves abound in unprecedented numbers--eagerly select from among these constructs and assemble them like so many pieces of a child's building kit to obtain their very own theories. Once formulated, a theory has several safeguards. First, it is unlikely to draw much criticism from other researchers, for other researchers are primarily concerned with their own theories. Second, when a theory does attract criticism, the critic almost always turns out to have misunderstood, and the theory stands as originally proposed. Third, on the rare occasion a criticism demands action, fine tuning will almost always suffice. Thus, the chances of a theory having to be abandoned or even appreciably revised as a consequence of criticism are vanishingly small, and hence researchers can be confident that their theories will stay alive just as long as they continue to nourish them.
So it is, then, that we have entered an age of personalized theorizing. But is this proper? Are theories really supposed to proliferate the way they have? Do a myriad of private concerns constitute the fundamentally public enterprise that is science?
In pondering these questions, we need to consider the reason for all the theorizing, to enquire what lies behind it. We can begin by dismissing any suggestion that it is the result of a deliberate policy laid down by those in our field who wield the most power. To be sure, journal editors typically promote superficial explanations and personalized theorizing by insisting that the findings of a research report be brought to theoretical account. But they are not breaking faith with those they serve, for virtually everyone involved in memory research is skeptical of the scientific mettle of anyone content with investigating someone else's theory without at least modifying it sufficiently to justify proclaiming their own version.
Could the proliferation of theories have its origin in faulty communication? Effective communication is a sine qua non of science, and memory psychologists typically do poorly by this criterion. On the other hand, their failures are not for lack of trying. Indeed, they struggle mightily for clarity, frequently devoting half the pages of their research reports to the effort. To argue that more careful description of memory theories would facilitate their refutation and so help keep their numbers in check would not, therefore, help matters much.
Stemming the flood of memory theories will, of course, require our being less prodigal in using hypothetical constructs. But resolving the root problem with our theorizing will require something more. Imagine, in a flight of fancy, that a wand were waved and some of the things we have stuffed into the rememberer magically disappeared. If the proportion of things thus done away with were large enough, the number of theories would be reduced below the number of researchers, and theory development and evaluation would become more of a shared endeavor. But it would not follow that we would be able to put the theories that remain to decisive tests.
The proliferation of hypothetical constructs, the problems researchers have in unambiguously describing their theories, and above all the difficulty in devising critical tests to discriminate among theories are to a large extent symptoms of a deeper problem, one that reaches down to the level of pretheoretical orientation. In a word, the problem is mediationism.
Mediationism
I am using the term mediation ism to refer to the doctrine that remembering an event requires that a representation of that event be embodied in a "memory trace" that is retained over the time between the event's occurrence and its recollection. Memory trace sometimes goes by other names, such as engram and representation, and it may be considered to be permanent or to fade or otherwise change over time. But, as it has since at least as far back as classical times, the core idea remains the same: As long as an event from the past can be remembered or can otherwise affect us, some sort of trace of that event is being retained and forms the basis of the memory or other effect.
Mediationist theories are often concerned, not just with the storage of an event in a memory trace, but with the retention of the trace within a store. As has been documented by Roediger (1979) , this store within the rememberer has been characterized in a bewildering number of ways-from storehouse (Locke, 1690/1850) to garbage cans (Landauer, 1975) to belly (Augustine, 399/1943; Hintzman, 1974 )-although apparently on no other basis than whim. For present purposes, not only are the differences among these characterizations unimportant, but so is the distinction between the idea of store in whatever guise and the idea of memory trace. Indeed, our concern is with the com-
